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Agency Costs in Apartment Property
Management Contracts
Sidney B. Rosenberg* and John B. Corgel**
Because fees for property management services are
based on gross rental collections rather than on net
operating incomes, property managers may not always
act in the best interest of property owners. This study
is an examination of the agency costs that result from
the conflict of interests between owners and managers.
A nationwide proprietary sample of 242 apartment
properties is analyzed to compare agency costs of four
distinct types of ownership structures. Agency costs,
measxired as operating expenses per square foot, are
found to be significantly higher for institutional owners
than for noninstitutional owners, but not significantly
higher in cases where no competition for property
management services exists. We conclude that agency
costs of property management contracts are significant
and the fee provisions of standard property manage-
ment contracts should be changed to better align the
interests of managers and owners.
INTRODUCTION
Seminal agency theory papers by Ross [13] and Jensen and
Meckling [9] explain how separation of ownership and manage-
ment may affect the structure of modern corporations. Work on
corporate and non-corporate agency questions has extended in
many directions. Rozeff [14] and Kim and Sorensen [10] found
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agency costs to be lower for firms with greater concentrations of
corporate ownership. Thakor and Ramakrishnan [18] demon-
strated the importance of agent monitoring to reduce agency
costs. People have also examined how different incentive/
disincentive arrangements affect agent behavior.
This stream of research has spilled over to the study of
contractual relationships in the general field of real estate. Solt
and Miller [16] recommend no positive incentives for REIT
managers; but instead, negative incentives for excessive ex-
penses, high loan loss reserves, losses on property sales, and
excessive debt. Zorn and Larsen [20] found that percentage fee
incentives in brokerage contracts are superior to a fiat fee
structure to obtain higher prices for sellers of real estate.
Property management contracts, negotiated between owners of
real estate and managers who collect rents, lease space and
maintain properties, establish agency relationships that hereto-
fore have not been examined empirically. With increasing
institutional ownership of real estate, the problems associated
with separation of ownership and management are potentially
more serious than in the past. The purpose of this paper is to
communicate the results of an empirical examination of agency
costs resulting from alternative property management relation-
ships, including those entered into by institutional and private
owners. We find that agency costs, as measured by variable
operating expenses per square foot, are significantly higher for
institutionally owned properties than for properties owned by
individuals and small partnerships.
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Confiicts arise between owners and managers because of differ-
ences in economic incentives when management's ownership
interest is less than 100%. The costs associated with such
confiicts include the costs of monitoring agents, bonding costs,
and residual losses in the value of ownership interests in firms
and assets (see Jensen and Meckling [9]). Among these, residual
losses are potentially the greatest.
Ownership concentration and competition for managerial
services may infiuence the costs of principal and agent relation-
ships. Agency costs increase as management's ownership shares
decline, and are lower when ownership is more concentrated,
especially in outside owners (Lease, McConnell and Michelson
[12]). Agency costs are also affected by how much competition
186 ROSENBERG AND CORGEL
exists for management from outside firms and by the costs of
replacing management (see Fama [4], Jensen and Meckling [9]).
Because future compensation for managers depends on company
performance, the responsiveness of managerial labor markets to
management performance serves as an effective agency cost
control.
The challenge to efficient contracting therefore is to identify
provisions that control agency costs when neither competition
nor ownership concentration are optimal. There has been much
interest in incentive compensation provisions that align the
interests of managers with those of owners. Bamea, Haugen and
Senbet [1] suggest that the optimal incentive for corporate
management consists of executive stock options. However, sym-
metric incentive contracts, that contain both bonuses for good
performance and penalties for poor performance, may produce
greater levels of effort from management than bonus-only con-
tracts (Starks [17]). The standard property management contract,
such as the contract produced by the Institute of Real Estate
Management (IREM) for multifamily properties, contains provi-
sions that do not address the incentives difference between
property owners and managers.
THE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
The IREM property management agreement establishes com-
pensation for property managers based on a percentage of gross
rental collections (i.e., effective gross income). Owners seek to
maximize net operating income (i.e., effective gross income less
operating expenses) and terminal values of properties. Because
the terminal values of income properties are related directly to
net operating incomes, long-term net operating income levels are
important measures of success in property management relation-
ships. Agents are driven by self-interest to increase gross
revenues and reduce vacancies because their compensation is
based on collected rents. Conflicts arise because property
managers do not have strong incentives to control operating
expenses and thus maximize net operating income. In theory,
management fees should be based on net operating income, not
effective gross income (see Jaffe [7, 8].
The form and terms of the management contracts used for
properties in this study are nearly identical to the IREM standard
agreement (Kyle [11]). The following provisions of these agree-
ments have a bearing on agency problems between property
owners and managers:
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1. Term and length of the contract
The term is generally one year with the provision that
it may be mutually renewed or cancelled upon payment
of a penalty. The contract also provides that if owners
intend to sell properties during the term of the manage-
ment agreement, property managers are given an ex-
clusive agency listing on the property for six months.
The one-year renewable term serves as an incentive for
agents to achieve the short-term operating goals of the
owner; however, this incentive is somewhat mitigated
by the penalty for early cancellation. The exclusive
brokerage clause discourages early sale of the property,
which may be motivated by poor property performance.
2. Agency authority and powers
Agents may advertise at any level. This gives agents
the incentive to increase advertising expenditure
beyond efficient levels because compensation is based
upon gross collections, and not net operating income.
Agents have the incentive to sign leases with marginal
tenants and "churn" tenants because additional com-
pensation is often payable for leasing activity.
Agents may collect charges for late payment, returned
checks, and subleasing charges and not account to
owners. This creates an obvious area of potential
abuses.
Agents can hire and fire employees. This provision
gives managers no incentive to control salary and wage
costs and gives owners no control over these activities.
Agents can make alteration expenditures and enter
into nonrecurring contracts for amounts within pre-
stated limits. This provision provides for outside
control and ratification by owners, but gives agents the
ability to make immediate decisions in areas of
superior knowledge.
3. Owner indemnification
Owners indemnify agents from law suits against the
premises. This clearly allocates risk to owners;
however, the provision is limited if agents are
negligent.
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4. Compensation
Basic compensation is a negotiated percentage of gross
collection with some minimum level. The agreement
also calls for fees for leasing apartments or commercial
space, for overseeing construction; other mutually
agreeable fees, such as incentive compensation; may
also be specified. Basing management fees on a per-
centage of gross collections and offering incentive
compensation for collection of gross rents above a
certain level gives agents incentives to maximize per-
formance relative to gross collections.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Four distinct owner-property management relationships are
examined in this study. Two of the relationships involve un-
related entities that selected the services of the property
management firm under competitive market conditions. These
unrelated ownership groups are categorized as either private
owners (i.e., private partnerships) or institutional owners (i.e.,
REITS and public partnerships). The other owners are
organizationally related to the subject property management
firm. They are similary categorized as either private or institu-
tional owners. The private ownership group is controlled by key
executives of the parent company that also owns the property
management firm. The individual majority owner of many of the
private partnerships is also the majority owner of the parent
company. Related private owners exercise extraordinary control
over property operations. For example, they can hire and fire
property management employees. Related private owners are
also knowledgeable about reasonable levels of operating ex-
penses. These related private owners, however, are obligated to
use the related property management firm.
The related institutional owners consist of REITs and public
partnerships managed by a subsidiary of the parent firm that
controls the property management firm. The related institutional
group is characterized by widely disbursed ownership and no
competition in the selection of property management services.
The parent corporation controls both asset managers and prop-
erty managers within this group, and asset management and
property management fees fiow to the parent corporation. The
potential for confiicts of interest between beneficial owners and
APARTMENT PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 189
the parent corporation is great because the control exercised by
the widely disbursed ownership group is limited. This grouping of
ownership entities allows for the measurement of agency effects
in property management contracts through the comparison of
agency costs between (1) institutional and private ownership
groups, and (2) competitive and non-competitive property
management contracting arrangements. All ownership groups
(including private related owners) are charged full management
fees, which are generally 5% of effective gross income. Agency
costs should be greatest for related institutions that exhibit
neither concentrated ownership nor competitive property
management selection. They should be lowest for related private
owners who offer superior ownership control and knowledge.
The four categories of owner-agent relationships are sum-
marized as follows (the number of observations in each category
is shown in parentheses):
1. Individual/Unrelated (44)
Individuals and private partnerships unrelated to the
property management firm. This is the normative prop-
erty management relationship wherein services of the
property management firm have been contracted on an
arm's-length basis in a competitive environment.
2. Individual/Related (61)
Individual and private partnerships that are related to
the property management firm. This group consists of
key executives with ownership interest in the property
management firm and in the properties being managed.
This ownership entity has both exceptional knowledge
of property operations and direct control to hire and
fire property managers.
3. Institutional/Unrelated (14)
Institutionl owners who are unrelated to the property
management firm. These institutions include savings
and loan associations, public partnerships, and REITs.
This is the normative property management relation-
ship, but because of dispersed ownership, they are
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expected to exercise less control over property oper-
ations than related and unrelated individual owners.
4. Institutional/Related (123)
Institutional owners who are related to the property
management firm. This group consists of REITs and
partnerships owned by the general public and managed
by a subsidiary of the parent firm.
The availability of data on property management relationships
has limited the study in the past of agency problems between
property owners and managers. The database used in this study
consists of the entire portfolio of one of the nation's largest
multifamily housing property management firms. The portfolio
includes over 300 garden apartment properties located in 27
states and contains more than 60,000 units. Certain properties
were eliminated from consideration because of missing inform-
ation. Nevertheless, 242 useable observations were retained. The
major drawback of this sample is that properties are somewhat
concentrated in the southeast and soutwest areas of the U.S.
Data were obtained from the 1986 annual operating statements
and the 1986 management summary report for each property and
from outside demographic sources. Data on area unemployment
and wage rates were taken from Employment and Earnings, U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics [19] that shows
unemployment and average wages from many MSAs and all
states. Percent of white collar employment in 1980, median years
of education in 1980, and median income of zip code area for 1987
were obtained from CACI [2].
Theory suggests that agency costs in property management
contracts are a function of the relationship between owners and
managers, the level of monitoring, monitoring costs, the control
exercised by owners, the degree of competition for property
management services, the compensation arrangement, and the
level of information available to owners. Because the com-
pensation provision in standard property management contracts
rewards managers for maximizing effective gross income, opera-
ting expenses will vary across properties according to how the
relationship between owners and managers is structured, all else
being equal. Assuming that all investors require the same
risk-adjusted returns, excessive operating expenses affect the
residual values of properties because bidders will discount
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properties for deferred maintenance and rent contract problems
(e.g., long-term leases with poor quality tenants at below-market
rents).'
The empirical literature is nearly silent on the relationship
between operating expenses and property values. Hoag [6], in a
study of factors that affect industrial property prices, found a
negative coefficient for operating expenses that is nearly twice its
standard error. Hedonic pricing of income properties is in its
infancy compared with the progress made in housing.
The agency costs to apartment owners are measured in this
study by the level of operating expenses per square foot (OESF).
This measure includes all operating expenses except real estate
taxes, utilities, casualty insurance expenses, replacement
reserves, and capital expenditures that are not generally under
the control of property managers and are subject to wide
variations across properties.^ Operating expenses are related to
vectors of: physical characteristics of properties (P), such as unit
size and project size; property-specific economic characteristics
(E), such as turnover, rent levels, and certain expenditure levels;
market-specific economic characteristics (M), such as employ-
ment and income; and a set of owner-agent factors (A), For the i"^
the property, the relationship is summarized as
OESF,=f(P,E,M,A;)+U, (1)
where fT, is a random error term.
The independent variables in Table 1 were selected on the
basis of previous studies, interviews with property management
executives, and available data. They are broadly classified as
agency and non-agency variables. The variables INCENTIV,
OWNRSHIP, and AGENCGRP capture agency effects. Table 2
contains descriptive information for selected variables.
Because OESF is not spatially defiated, MSASIZE is included
in the model. The variables UNITSIZE and A^ ; are introduced to
control for property scale factors. A shortcoming of the database
is the absence of information about the age of the properties. The
'We assumed that the expected cost of capital is the same across rental markets
except for risk differences. This point was expressed by one of the referees.
Replacement reserves are calculated by appraisers, but generally owners do not
set up reserves. Several expense items that would normally be included in
replacement reserve accounts were included in the capital improvement account
which was also excluded from OESF.
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TABLE 1
Independent Variables
(Dependent Variable—O£Sf)
Explanation
Geographic regions following IREM designations,
coded as dummy variables {Rl . . . R5).
MSA size as of 1980 census shown in millions.
Average unit size in square feet.
Total number of units in the project, coded as
dummy variables {Nl . . . N5).
Annual expenditure per sq. ft. for property repairs
and capital expenditures (excluded from OESF).
Median years of education in the property's zip code
in 1980.
Ratio of average monthly rent annualized to pro-
jected 1987 median income of the property's zip
code.
Average monthly gross rent per sq. ft.
Annual expenditure per sq. ft. for services from
outside contractors.
Ratio of number of units in the project rented in
1986 to total number of units.
MSA or state average hourly industrial wage.
Type of ownership structure and relationship coded
as dummy variables {Al . .. Ai).
Ownership interest of the principals of the parent
firm. Coded as dummy variables in two groups.
(1 = less than 50% ownership).
Incentive payments to property managers per sq. ft.
in 1986.
'Coefficient signs for the dummy variables in the NUMUNITS group are expected to be positive for
projects with less than 200 units and negative for projects with more than 300 units.
level of capital expenditures is assumed to be highly correlated
with age, and thus CAPEXP is an instrument for age.
Variations in real costs among localities is controlled for by
the introduction of i?,, WAGES, TURNOVER, OUTSERV, and
RENTSF; the latter of which proxies the level of amenity service
flows from the apartment properties. Finally, YRSEDU and
RENTINC are included to control for differences in tenant and
neighborhood quality across properties.
HYPOTHESES
The first hypothesis (ownership concentration hypothesis) is
that operating expenses are higher for properties in which
Variable
REGION (R)
MSASIZE
UNITSIZE
NUMUNITS (N)
CAPEXP
YRSEDU
RENTINC
RENTSF
OUTSERV
TURNOVER
V^AGES
AGENCGRPiA)
OWNRSHIP
INCENTIV
Expected Sign
unknown
+
+ / - '
+
-
+
+
+
+
+
-
-
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owners exercise less direct control and monitoring of operations.
Operating expenses should be higher for properties owned by
institutions such as pension funds, REITs, and public partnerships
than for properties owned by individuals and private partner-
ships. Individual owners and small groups of owners with direct
TABLE 2
Descriptive Information for Selected Variables
Variable
OESF: Total annual
variable operating
expenses per sq. ft.'
MSASIZE: MSA size as
of 1980 census (in
millions)
UNITSIZE: Average unit
size (in sq. ft.)
CAPEXP: Annual
expenditures per sq. ft.
for property repairs
and capital expenditures
(excluded from OESF)
YRSEDU: Median years of
education in the
property's zip code
in 1980
RENTING Ratio of
average monthly rent
annualized to projected
1987 median income of the
property's zip code
RENTSF: Average monthly
gross rent per sq. ft.
OUTSERV: Annual
expenditures per sq.
ft. for services from
outside contractors
INCENTIV: Incentive
pay to property
employees per sq. ft.
TURNOVER: Ratio of number
of units in the project
rented in 1986 to
total number of units
WAGES: MSA or state
average hourly
industrial wage, 1986
Mean
1.488
1.J27
904.71
0.6631
13.38
0.1476
0.4258
0.0273
0.0204
0.7503
9.860
Standard
Deviation
0.3151
1.203
163.91
0.5877
1.203
0.0412
0.0937
0.0492
0.0654
0.2575
1.290
Minimum
Value
0.7810
0.0040
511
0.0363
9.40
0.0722
0.2400
0.0000
0.0000
0.1607
6.990
Maximum
Value
2.885
7.477
1488
5.110
16.20
0.4073
0.8200
0.3563
1.000
1.645
13.73
'Means and Standard deviations for the four ownership groups are Al: 1.456, 0.3012; A2: 1.432, 0.3025;
Ai: 1.538, 0.4178; and A4: 1.520, 0.3101.
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financial stakes in properties are likely to monitor operating
expenses more closely than institutions that have more dispersed
ownership. Individuals and small partnerships also may be more
sensitive to short-term cash fiow needs, and thus may be more
inclined to terminate marginally performing management firms.
The signs and significance ofthe AGENCGRP, OWNRSHIP and
reformulated AGENCGRP variables indicate the importance of
individual versus institutional ownership and ownership con-
centration for explaining variation in operating expenses.
The second hypothesis (market competition hypothesis) is that
operating expenses are expected to be higher when there is no
competition in the selection of property management firms. A
reformulated AGENCGRP dummy variable, RELINST (1 = A4,
O = A1, A3), contrasts ownership by related institutions in which
no competition exists for property management services, with
other ownership forms in which competition does exist.
Hypothesis three (operating expenses hypothesis) states that
properties owned by individuals and private partnerships, in
which either the general partner or owner is a key executive of
the property management firm, experience lower advertising
expenses per square foot and less turnover than other properties
in the portfolio. These owners not only have a greater level of
knowledge concerning normal operating expenses and tenant
turnover, but also have more direct control over operations
through their ability to hire, fire and promote property manage-
ment personnel. By increasing the level of advertising and
reducing the criteria of tenant selection, property managers may
increase gross revenue. However, marked increases in adver-
tising expenses or reduction in tenant selection standards may
cause net operating income to fall. Regressions explaining both
advertising expenses per square foot (ASEF) and tenant turnover
(TURNOVER) are run to test this hypothesis.
Finally, we hypothesize (incentive payment hypothesis) that if
direct incentive compensation is paid to property management
personnel for good performance, then agency costs will be lower.
An incentive payment variable {INCENTIV) is included in the
operating expense equation to test this hypothesis.
RESULTS
The results of regressing OESF on the full set of independent
variables, excluding OWNRSHIP, INCENTIV, RELINST and
RELPRIN, are shown in Table 3. The parameters of the model
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TABLE 3
Comparison of Functional Forms
Form
Department
Variable
INTERCEPT
RI
R2
Ri
R4
MSASIZE
UNITSIZE
Nl
N2
N3
N4
CAPEXP
YRSEDU
RENTINC
RENTSF
OUTSERV
TURNOVER
WAGES
Al
Al
Al
Max Condition
Number
N=242
Linear
OESF
1.3750
(5.604)'
- 0.0050
(-0.077)
0.0601
(0.877)
0.1072
(0.957)
-0.0410
(-0.584)
0.0372
(3.207)'
- 0.0008
(-8.521)'
0.2017
(3.406)'
0.1356
(2.831)'
0.0678
(1.397)
0.0I9I
(0.340)
0.0546
(2.512)"
0.0032
(0.252)
-0.1903
(-0.474)
1.2008
(6.256)'
1.2872
(4.625)'
0.1928
(3.574)'
0.0029
(0.232)
- 0.0909
(-2.573)"
-0.1347
(-4.102)'
- 0.0956
(-1.714) '"
0.688
75.24
Semi-Log
In OESF
0.3735
(2.458)"
- 0.0129
(-0.319)
0.0321
(0.764)
0.0356
(0.512)
-0.0341
(-0.784)
0.0217
(3.025)'
- 0.0006
(-9.454)'
0.II7I
(3.194)'
0.820
(2.763)'
0.0419
(1.394)
0.0II8
(0.337)
0.0377
(2.803)'
0.0028
(0.361)
-0.1655
(-0.665)
0.7317
(6.155)'
0.8483
(4.922)'
0.1229
(3.679)'
0.0011
(0.166)
- 0.0586
(-2.680)'
- 0.0887
(-4.363)'
- 0.0783
(-2.267)"
0.709
75.24
Logarithmic
OESF
7.003
(10.898)'
- 0.0202
(-0.311)
0.0505
(0.749)
0.1418
(1.265)
-0.0270
(-0.387)
0.0177
(1.716)'"
-0.8147
( - 8.658)'
0.2110
(3.526)'
0.1511
(3.136)'
0.0918
(1.887)"'
0.0388
(0.687)
0.0574
(3.004)'
0.0413
(0.230)
- 0.0507
(-0.756)
0.5360
(6.046)'
1.423
(5.149)'
0.1357
(3.569)'
0.1140
(0.956) •
. - 0.0829
(-2.296)"
-0.1125
(-3.472)'
- 0.0720
(-1.234)
0.684
217.40
Double-Log
In OESF
4.009
(10.118)'
- 0.0228
(-0.569)
0.0313
(0.753)
0.0564
(0.816)
- 0.0269
(-0.627)
0.0105
(1.650)
-0.5249
(-9.047)'
0.1246
(3.379)'
0.0919
(3.094)'
0.0574
(1.913)'"
0.0240
(0.689)
0.0387
(3.282)'
0.0013
(0.012)
-0.0500
(-I .2II)
0.3562
(6.519)'
0.9416
(5.527)'
0.0872
(3.719)'
0.0620
(0.844)
- 0.0534
(-2.401)"
- 0.0744
(-3.723)'
-0.0649
(-1.806)"'
0.708
217.40
Coefficients are in the body of the table with (-ratios in parenthesis. Independent variables are logs when
logarithmic and double log fonns are tested except for OUTSERV and dummy variables (R, N, and A).
'significant at the 0.01 level "significant at the 0.05 level '"significant at the 0.10 level
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are estimated using four functional forms; linear, semi-log,
logarithmic, and double-log. Taken together, the independent
variables have high explanatory power, although some co-
efficients are not significantly different from zero. The signs and
sizes of coefficients and the explanatory power of this model are
not radically different under the four different functional forms.
Multicollinearity is tested by using condition number, and the
higher indices found in the logarithmic and double-log equations
indicate that multicollinearity is a greater problem using these
functional forms.^  Thus, tests of hypotheses were conducted using
the linear form. The signs of the coefficient of the agency group
variables are all negative and significant, indicating that the
highest agency costs exist when owners and property managers
are organizationally related (the default group).
Maximum condition numbers, however, revealed a high degree
of multicollinearity among the independent variables with all
functional forms. A comparison of the regression results and the
correlation matrix also showed several cases in which opposite
signs were found between regression coefficients and first-order
correlation coefficients. Attempts were then made to construct
models that reduced multicollinearity. For instance, variables
within the same hypothesized vectors of characteristics were
deleted. In some cases these equations had explanatory power
nearFy equal to the full model and all variables were significant
at the 0.05 level. However, high condition numbers in diagnostic
tests indicated that multicollinearity continued to be a problem."
Factor analysis was chosen to lessen the effects of multi-
collinearity. This approach was deemed appropriate because the
objective of the research is to test the effect of agency variables
on OESF while holding the effects of other factors constant.
Although the individual variables may no longer be identifiable
after factor analysis, the variables of interest can be separated
from the factors and tested in regression equations together with
the factors. Guntermann and Norrbin [5] used this approach to
reduce collinearity among variables measuring common area
amenities in their study of apartment rents.
Principal component analysis was performed on the data
using OESF as the dependent variable and the full set of
^Condition indices are the square roots of the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to
each eigenvalue. A collinearity prohlem may exist when high condition indices
are found [15].
••Tests were also conducted for heteroscedasticity, and no significant problem
was discovered.
APARTMENT PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 197
independent variables, excluding agency variables of specific
interest. The factors were rotated using the Varimax rotation
method, and five factors were retained using the Mineigen One
section criteria and plots.
Results of the first test of the ownership concentration
hypothesis are presented in Table 4. Factors 1, 3, 4 and 5 are
significant and the maximum condition number is reduced
dramatically.^ Among the agency group variables, the coefficient
of A2 (individual/related) is significantly lower than the default
group, A4 (institutional/related). As hypothesized, OESF for the
related private ownership group properties are significantly
lower than for properties owned by related institutions. Based on
the size of the coefficient of A2 in T'able 4, the per square foot loss
resulting from reduced ownership control is $0,087 or 6% of its
mean value.
Ownership concentration effects were further tested by in-
cluding in separate regressions OWNRSHIP (1 = principals of
TABLE 4
Test of Ownership Concentration
Dependent Variable = OESF
t-Ratio
76.039'
7.754'
1.289
- 2 . 5 3 7 "
13.925*
2.022"
-0 .914
- 2.461"
-0 .518
Variable
INTERCEPT
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Factor 5
Al (Individual/Unrel.)
A2 (Individual/Rel.)
Ai (Institution/Unrel.)
F= 33.514
R' = 0.5350
Max. Condition
Number = 2.43
N = 2 4 2
'significant at 0.01 level
"significant at 0.05 level
"'significant at 0.1 level
Coefficient
1.5203
0.1193
0.0204
- 0.0405
0.2417
0.0340
-0.0363
-0.0870
-0.0327
^Maximum condition numbers are also much lower from each of the other
principal component regressions run to test the hypotheses in this study.
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the parent company own less than 50%) and a reformulated
AGENCGRP variable NEWAGEN (1 = A1 and A2, the two
individual ownership categories) in the OESF equation. As
shown in Tahle 5, the coefficient on OWNRSHIP indicates no
significant difference between properties in which principals
have less than 50% ownership and the default category in which
they owned 50% or more of the properties. However, as indicated
hy the significant coefficient of NEWAGEN, OESF for privately
owned properties are significantly lower than institutionally
owned properties primarily because of the degree of control
exercised by private owners. This finding is not surprising given
the results in Table 4.
The market competition hypothesis was tested in an OESF
equation that included control factors and the variable
RELINST (1 = A4, O = A1 and AS). Operating expenses were not
TABLE 5
Further Tests of Ownership Concentration
Dependent Variable = OESF
Variable
INTERCEPT
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Factor 5
OWNRSHIP (I =
less than 50% parent
ownership)
N£WV/iG£N{I=AlandA2)
f
R^  ~
Max. Condition
Number
N
1.4440
(35.512)*
0.0369
(1.370)
-0.0224
( - 0.789)
0.0936
(3.234)*
0.2295
(8.186)*
0.0307
(0.999)
- 0.0203
(-0.369)
—
13.764
0.6046
2.90
61'
1.5171
(79.768)*
0.1188
(7.824)*
0.0214
(1.357)
-0.0367
(-2.349)**
0.2403
(13.894)*
0.0366
(2.207)**
- 0.0627
(-2.141)**
44.515
0.5320
2.29
242
'Only the sixty-one observations in group Al (individual/related) were considered in the OWNRSHIP test.
*significant at 0.01 level
**significant at 0.05 level
***significant at 0.10 level
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significantly different between the related institution's properties
and other properties, thus failing to support the hypothesis that
competition in the selection of property management reduces
OESF. Tests with TURNOVER and AESF on the left side of the
equation produced low R^ values and did not provide support for
the hypothesis that related private owner properties had lower
turnover and advertising expenses than other properties. Finally,
tests of the incentive payment hypothesis, which involved the use
of the variable INCENTIV, did not produce support for the
notion that higher incentive payments result in lower OESF.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examined the agency costs to property owners
of entering into standard property management contracts. The
empirical evidence shows that institutional owners incur signi-
ficant agency costs in contracting for property management
services. These costs are a function of the level of control
exercised by owners, but not necessarily the extent of com-
petition for property management services. Agency costs are the
result of a conflict between the utility of owners and managers.
This conflict exists because property management contracts offer
no incentive for managers to reduce operating expenses and may
offer incentives for managers to operate at expense levels that
are excessive.
The results of the study show that agency costs, as measured
by variable operating expenses per square foot, are significantly
higher (6%) for institutionally owned properties than for proper-
ties owned by individuals and small partnerships. However, the
results do not support hypotheses that agency costs are reduced
by competition in the market for property management services
and that managers speciflcally abuse advertising expense and
encourage tenant turnover to generate additional fees. Incentive
compensation arrangements with employees also were not found
to be important for reducing agency costs.
The weakness of the property management contract is that
compensation is based on gross rental collections rather than on
net operating income. While it is much simpler to administer
contracts based on gross collections, the evidence of significant
agency costs merits consideration of a change in standard
property management contract provisions. The potential for
residual losses should be considered in structuring property
management compensation arrangements. Previous research in
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corporate finance and real estate has shown that contractually
aligning the interests of owners and managers with respect to
agent compensation reduces agency costs. Finally, as institu-
tional ownership of real estate increases, agency problems in
property management relationships will likely increase.
The authors are indebted to the two anonymous referees and Donald
Haurin for suggestions that resulted in a much improved paper. All errors
in the final version are the responsibility of the authors.
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